Twentieth Century Chronicle

Page 213

After calming down, he countered Lin Xinyi's question: "If we don't talk about lifelines and interests, does the Navy really believe that peace in East Asia can guarantee Japan's defense? Isn't that a presupposition from the Navy's perspective? Whether it's the Chinese or the Russians, once these two continental powers recover, they will definitely squeeze Japan out of the mainland. After losing Korea, what security can the Japanese archipelago have? Moreover, we seized Taiwan and huge reparations from the Chinese. Do you think the Chinese don't remember that?"

Tamura's doubts were also considered reasonable by Togo Masamichi. As a Japanese soldier, no matter how much he boasted about his achievements in the Sino-Japanese War, he could not avoid the reality that Japan and China had indeed formed a deep-seated hatred. If China could not be further weakened, it was hard to guarantee that China would not retaliate against Japan after it recovered.

For the Japanese, especially those who grew up learning Chinese culture, it was hard to believe that China would simply sink into oblivion. Less than a century after the Mongols destroyed the Han Chinese regime, the Han Chinese drove the Mongols back to the grasslands and restored China. This Manchu conquest of China marked the longest period of subjugation under foreign rule. However, after the Eight-Nation Alliance invaded Beijing, the Han Chinese consciousness was reawakened, and Manchu rule was destroyed in a very short time.

Perhaps the Chinese themselves view the Mongol and Jurchen rule as a shameful part of history, but to outsiders, the continuous resurgence of Chinese consciousness is astonishing, because, from the perspective of current world history, there is no record of such continuous revival among extinct nation-states. Even Polish patriots, who largely embraced German or Russian culture, are unlikely to emulate the historical Polish nation-state they seek to restore.

This concern gradually became a reality with the rise of the regime in Wuhan and the performance of the Chinese army in this war. At least that's what Tamura believed. The army in Wuhan was completely different from the Qing army, and even different from the Beiyang Army. The Wuhan army not only imitated the European military system in terms of its structure, but also innovated its military ideology, which was the most distinctive feature of the Beiyang Army.

The assessment of the Wuhan army and the Beiyang army was not Tamura's personal opinion, but rather a conclusion reached by the Army General Staff after careful investigation. For example, army officers who had close ties with the Beiyang army believed that although the Beiyang army was well-trained, it still followed the personnel system of the Huai Army, where civilians were valued above military officers, and personal relationships took precedence over hierarchical relationships. Therefore, the Beiyang army could be regarded as Yuan Shikai's army, just like the Huai Army, and no one could command it without Yuan Shikai.

As for the Wuhan army, the investigators believed that this army was almost no different from the Japanese army. Its subordinates were highly obedient, and it was rare to see personal relationships taking precedence over normal orders. Even if the generals disagreed with the instructions from Wuhan, they would not disobey orders in the field, which was a very normal phenomenon in the Qing army and the Beiyang army.

Therefore, the Wuhan army, like the Japanese army, would not consider the execution of their operational objectives after discussing them. In contrast, the Qing army and the Beiyang army would need to spend a lot of time confirming whether their allies were acting according to plan in order to avoid becoming isolated.

Japanese investigators also specifically pointed out that the relationship between officers and soldiers in the Wuhan army was far more harmonious than that in the Japanese army. Japanese officers and soldiers had almost no communication with each other, and Japanese officers consistently used only brutal punishments without any gentle reassurance. Therefore, the conflicts between Japanese officers and soldiers were also quite severe. However, the Japanese, having undergone patriotic education, were able to tolerate the abuse from officers, which was an advantage the Japanese army had over the Qing army and the Beiyang Army. But once faced with a stalemate, the morale of the Japanese army declined considerably, far less than the Wuhan army's ability to sustain a prolonged war.

The Japanese investigators did not make baseless conjectures, but rather drew their conclusions by comparing the performance of the Wuhan army in the protracted fighting in the Liaoxi Corridor with the Japanese army's operations in the Liaoshen region. In the protracted fighting in the Liaoxi Corridor, the Wuhan army was almost always at a disadvantage, relying entirely on trench warfare to wear down the morale of the Russian army, and then winning through counterattacks.

However, the morale of the defending troops was also weakened in trench warfare, as enduring Russian artillery fire was no easy task. The Beiyang Army, employing the same tactics, never managed to withstand the combined artillery and assault tactics of the Russians. After several rounds of shelling, the Beiyang Army lost its ability to organize its frontline positions, immediately turning and retreating at the sight of a Russian charge, leaving the trenches exposed. Even after suffering losses in the shelling, the Wuhan Army was still able to organize counter-attacks and thwart Russian assaults.

The same situation occurred on the battlefields of southern and western Liaoning. Neither the Japanese nor the Russian armies displayed the tenacious spirit of the Wuhan army. Once their offensive tactics failed or their defenses faltered, both the Japanese and Russian armies would collapse. In fact, even worse situations arose in the army during the war. Some officers were stabbed to death by fleeing soldiers while trying to stop them from deserting. Such incidents were concealed because they greatly damaged the image of the Imperial Army.

Tanaka Giichi wrote a report on this situation in the military, arguing that a lack of communication between officers and soldiers made it difficult for soldiers to continue obeying officers' orders when the war went against them. In order to survive, these soldiers would vent their pent-up resentment and take violent actions against officers. In the past, when the Japanese army fought against Korea and the Qing Dynasty, they were in a superior position, so this kind of officer-soldier conflict was masked by the victory.

However, the battle with the Russian army was evenly matched. In fact, the Japanese army was at a psychological disadvantage because there was no precedent for victory in a war between yellow and white people. The army would not promote the story of the Chinese army defeating the British army in Tibet to boost morale. Therefore, when the war against Russia began, the Japanese army went to the battlefield with the belief that they would die fighting.

As the war reached a stalemate, the contradictions between Japanese officers and soldiers were amplified. Even in battles where the Japanese army won, they suffered considerable casualties due to the superior military skills of the Russian army. This was completely different from the battles against Koreans and Chinese. The Russian army's use of artillery made the Japanese army feel a lack of confidence as the victors, while Koreans and Chinese could not possibly have that many artillery pieces.

Tanaka Giichi therefore advocated that the training syllabus should be adjusted to improve the antagonistic relationship between officers and soldiers. In addition to maintaining strictness in military training, officers should become fathers and elder brothers to their soldiers in life, and soldiers should become family members of their officers. This would establish a habit of sons or younger brothers obeying their parents, and thus avoid the conflicts between officers and soldiers that are currently breaking out in the war.

Tanaka Giichi's proposals were taken seriously by the General Staff. After comparing the investigation reports from the Wuhan army, it can only be said that Tanaka was favored by Yamagata not only because of his good background, but also because Tanaka had good ideas about army building.

Therefore, although some lower-ranking officers and soldiers still held a sense of superiority over the Chinese brought about by the Sino-Japanese War, high-ranking army officers like Tamura had begun to seriously consider the performance of the Wuhan army in the war, believing that China's military had shown signs of recovery before its politics, and that the Chinese army would inevitably become a powerful opponent for Japan on the mainland.

The question that follows is whether China will seek revenge against Japan for the Treaty of Shimonoseki once its national power begins to recover. Since this cannot be confirmed, the army's top brass has made containing China's resurgence the top priority, while cooperation is a secondary option. Only if China does not pose a threat to Japan is there a possibility of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

However, it is clear that these army generals did not realize that if China's strength was not enough to threaten Japan, then was there any need for Japan and China to cooperate? Therefore, for the army, Japan-China cooperation was actually a temporary policy before Japan annexed China. It was as if the Japanese felt that they did not yet have the strength to annex China, so Japan and China could cooperate temporarily. When Japan's national strength increased to the point that it could annex China, the cooperation would end.

While Togo Masamichi wasn't as fearful of China's resurgence as the army generals—after all, naval development isn't instantaneous, and as long as China's naval power remained low, the perceived threat from the navy wouldn't be a major concern—as a Japanese, he also harbored a desire to contain China's development and subjugate it to Japan. He reasoned that a resurgence in China would inevitably lead to the development of its naval power.

Therefore, after listening to Tamura's words, Lin Xinyi understood Tamura's mentality very well. The perpetrator has no sense of guilt towards the victim, only the idea of ​​constantly suppressing the victim until the victim loses the ability to retaliate. In the Japanese military, the only one who really wanted to establish a peaceful order in East Asia was himself. Others either opposed East Asian peace or regarded East Asian peace as a means to achieve their goals.

Therefore, Lin Xinyi asked Tamura without hesitation: "Does advocating for lifelines and interests eliminate anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans and Chinese? Today, the army has achieved absolute dominance on the Korean Peninsula, but the self-organized militia of Koreans without an army makes it impossible for the Japanese to even control the villages."

So how does the army plan to safeguard the Korean Peninsula, this lifeline? Will it exterminate all Koreans, or continue to expand its troop presence on the Korean Peninsula? Based on the colonial history of the British occupation of the Americas or India, it would take a hundred years to conquer those Native American tribes without their own cultural and historical traditions. For the Indians, who have their own traditional culture, the British Empire spent a hundred years and could only barely establish its rule. Assimilating the Indian people would have been an impossible task.

In today's rapidly changing world, who would give Japan decades to conquer Korea, let alone the even larger regions of China and Southeast Asia? Therefore, the concepts of lifeline and interest are merely perspectives rooted in a static worldview, and they are out of step with the needs of our time.

Compared to the desire for revenge against Japan among the Chinese and North Korean people, the most pressing threat is the extermination of the cultural traditions of people of color by white civilization. As a soldier, one should consider the overall picture of the war, not the gains and losses of localized areas. Attempting to win every local conflict will only cost you the victory in the entire war.

Since Chief of Staff Tamura translated "On War," he should understand this point. Japan is currently on the front lines of a war between the yellow race and the white race. What it should be considering now is how to ensure the survival and continuation of the yellow race, rather than worrying about internal wars among the yellow race.

Even assuming China were to conquer Japan, Japanese traditional culture would not disappear. However, if white people won the war, people of color would truly become slaves to white people, or even worse. I think Chief of Staff Tamura is certainly aware of the White Australia Policy, and that the last Tasmanian died in 1876. The Japanese should be wary of suffering the same fate as the Tasmanians, rather than worrying about China's resurgence.

In this era, European colonizers were utterly inhumane. The term "genocide" is a foreign loanword from Europe; the concept of genocide does not exist in the East. Even the brutal Qing Dynasty, when it exterminated the Dzungar tribe, did so under the pretext that the Dzungars were defying the court, not because of their skin color or cultural traditions.

In fact, when the Manchus exterminated the Dzungar tribe, they were eliminating the power lineage of the Dzungar tribe, not all Dzungars. According to the traditions of the grasslands, the Dzungar tribe, having lost its masters, would inevitably become herders or slaves of other tribes, and these people would no longer be seen as a threat to the court.

However, Western genocide policies are top-down extermination; regardless of whether you have accepted Western cultural traditions, your skin color and bloodline become grounds for slaughter. Therefore, when Hayashi Shin-yi raised the banner of racial confrontation, Tamura immediately fell silent. He clearly agreed with Hayashi's statement that racial confrontation was more dangerous than Sino-Japanese confrontation; the latter would at most result in Japan becoming a vassal state of China, but the former would truly lead to the extermination of the Japanese people.

Those army generals who clamored that Japan could not be preserved without conquering the continent essentially agreed that racial conflict between East and West was inevitable. They believed that Japan should strengthen itself before this racial war arrived to avoid being defeated and massacred by Western powers. Hayashi Shin-yi's prioritization of racial conflict indicates that he and a segment of the army shared the same view that a future racial war was inevitable.

Therefore, Tamura can no longer regard Hayashi Shin-yi's advocacy of East Asian peace as a conclusion drawn from the different positions of the Army and Navy. Following Hayashi Shin-yi's line of thought, Tamura can understand why Hayashi Shin-yi advocates East Asian peace, because a peaceful East Asia can enhance the strength of East Asian countries, thus making it easier to deal with future racial conflicts.

If we view East Asian peace from this perspective, then Hayashi Shin-yi's proposals cannot be considered solely for the benefit of the navy. Of course, understanding Hayashi Shin-yi's proposals is one thing; whether the army can accept his perceived goals for East Asian peace is another.

Just as Tamura criticized Hayashi Nobuyoshi's views as being too naval-centric, the real majority of army generals were actually army-centric. These generals would not consider racial confrontation as a priority; they always put the interests of the army first, and even the interests of Japan as a nation would be secondary.

So, after much deliberation, Tamura realized that his biggest problem wasn't how to persuade Hayashi Shinichi to accept the army's position, but rather how to convince the army itself that its interests needed to be sacrificed for national and racial interests. Based on his understanding of these army generals, he knew that no matter how he explained things, if he suggested that the army's interests weren't paramount, he would be branded a traitor to the army.

Seeing that Tamura remained silent for a long time, Lin Xinyi seemed to realize that Tamura was hesitating about something, so he asked, "Is it because you are so eager to meet with Vice Minister Togo that the position of Minister of the Army will fall to you? Is that why you need to know the Navy's position?"

Tamura stared at Hayashi Nobuyoshi for a moment, not surprised that the other could see through this, and replied frankly, "That is indeed the case. After Kigoshi resigned, the military hoped that I would take over as minister, but if the problem of military downsizing cannot be solved, my position as minister will only last a few days. That's why I wanted to talk to Vice Minister Togo to see if we could negotiate with the Navy."

I have always advocated for coordination between the Army and the Navy. If I were to be ousted by the Navy, the antagonism within the Army towards the Navy would likely be truly palpable. Does the Navy really intend to remain at odds with the Army?

Togo Masamichi remained silent. Tamura's words were practically a showdown; if the Army and Navy were to truly confront him, he felt he might not be able to bear the responsibility. However, Hayashi Shin-yi didn't seem to think the problem was that serious, but he also didn't directly answer Tamura's question.

"The navy actually has three origins: the naval training institute of the shogunate, the Satsuma clique, and the Kaientai founded by Sakamoto Ryoma. However, the navy's founding ideology has remained unchanged: the global vision and strengthening of the foundation of the empire advocated by Katsu Kaishu and Sakamoto Ryoma. Today, the navy's advocacy for Japan-China reconciliation and the establishment of an East Asian cooperation mechanism is also based on the ideological foundation of the two naval founders. To say that the navy seeks to confront the army shows that the army doesn't understand the history of the navy. Then I would like to ask the Chief of Staff, what exactly are the army's ambitions?"

Chapter 694

Chapter 694

Tamura Iyozo suddenly realized that he had been stumped by Hayashi Shin-yi's question. He originally thought he was very clear about the army's ambition, which was to protect Japan from invasion by foreign powers. However, after the war against Russia, the army obviously did not focus on preventing foreign invasion, but instead focused on how to expand on the continent.

After the war, everyone in Japan knew that the probability of the great powers invading Japan, which had once made them so fearful, was very low. After all, after the Battle of Cam Ranh Bay, Japan had become a maritime power that could rival the European powers.

Although they cannot yet compare with the British Royal Navy and the German Navy, the Japanese believe that their navy is at least capable of confronting fleets like those of the United States and France in East Asia. As for Italy and Austria-Hungary, they believe they are simply incapable of coming to Asia to confront the Japanese navy.

If we disregard the army's own interests, then Tamura actually agrees with the navy's advocacy of military downsizing, because in the short term, Japan's external threats have been reduced to almost the minimum.

If the goal is to develop the domestic economy, then reducing military spending is clearly a good idea. However, from the army's perspective, the navy's approach is undoubtedly anti-military, smacks of betrayal and disregard for the interests of the military. After the military has made significant sacrifices for national security, is it morally justifiable for the country to prioritize downsizing in order to develop?

It was precisely because the army felt a profound sense of disappointment at being disarmed after such a victory that they united in their opposition to the downsizing. Even those within the army who were at odds with the Choshu faction approved Terauchi's resignation. Therefore, when Hayashi Nobuyoshi raised this question, Tamura found it difficult to continue emphasizing that the army's purpose was to protect the country, because the army was currently only thinking about itself.

Tamura came here to exchange ideas with the Navy, not to save face for the Army. Therefore, he couldn't force the Army's opposition to military downsizing to be shrouded in patriotism. However, he was also unwilling to criticize the Army's insistence on military expansion as a form of Army-centricism. So he asked in return, "Then what should the Navy's aspirations be?"

Faced with Tamura's evasiveness, Hayashi Shinji did not press the matter further. He went along with it, saying, "The Navy is not very clear about the Army's current ambitions, but it does know a little about the Army's history. In fact, although the Army's origins are the anti-shogunate coalition, the true roots of today's Army are the Kiheitai (Special Forces) established by Takasugi Togyoku, which were essentially a bandit force."

The ideology of the grassroots armed forces originated from the predecessors Yoshida and Kusaka. Kusaka Genzui stated: "The feudal lords are unreliable, the court nobles are unreliable; there is no other strategy than to unite with grassroots patriots." Therefore, the Meiji Restoration government was essentially a new government established by the rise of the grassroots. What are the grassroots? They are simply commoners. Thus, the Meiji Restoration was, in effect, a politics of the common people; and the grassroots armed forces were simply civilian armed forces.

Masujiro Ōmura took Takasugi's grassroots military ideology a step further, eliminating the hierarchical mindset within the army and freeing it from the control of the samurai class. This is why the army calls itself the National Army, because it is an armed force composed of the people. In this army, there should be no inherent nobles or lowly commoners; everyone is simply a soldier serving the country.

Looking at the origins and development of the army, its ambition has always been singular: to establish a people's nation where everyone is equal. The so-called "Emperor-led army" proposed by Yamagata Genro was not the army's aspiration. In my view, after the Satsuma Rebellion, the army lost its way and its purpose. While it's said that everyone in the army can recite the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers, how many truly know the Five Articles of the Oath?

The army and navy established a new Japan based on the Five Articles of the Oath, not on the Imperial Rescript to the Military. Does Commander-in-Chief Tamura still acknowledge this?

Togo Masamichi looked at Tamura's expression with some unease. He felt that Hayashi Shinichi's words seemed to have gone too far. Although soldiers like to make some arrogant remarks, as they cannot show their bravery and fearlessness otherwise, it is a taboo for the military to make any remarks on the issue of the Emperor's army. If Tamura seizes on this matter, it will be difficult for him, as an onlooker, to find any excuse.

However, Tamura was far calmer than he had imagined. He did not show anger at Hayashi Nobuyoshi's arrogant remarks, but instead fell into deep thought. In fact, because Togo Masamichi was not in Tamura's position, he could not understand the other layer of meaning in Hayashi Nobuyoshi's words, which was that Hayashi Nobuyoshi was refuting Yamagata Aritomo's claim that he had created the army.

After Ōmura Masujirō was killed in an attack, Ōmura's vision for a new army was finally realized in the hands of Yamagata Aritomo. As a result, Yamagata Aritomo, who institutionalized the army, is known as the father of the army, thus separating the army from the previous anti-shogunate coalition.

Because Yamagata Aritomo is regarded as the founder of the army today, the Choshu faction has achieved an unshakable dominant position in the army. Opposition to the Choshu faction is easily interpreted as opposition to the army system.

Although Hideaki Tojo was highly respected among the younger generation of the army, he was easily driven out of the army by the Choshu faction. The fundamental reason for this was that the Choshu faction was deeply bound to the army system. In a sense, the Choshu faction now represented the orthodoxy of the army, and opposing the Choshu faction was opposing the army itself.

Therefore, although Tojo Hideaki's anti-Chōshū faction stance received considerable support, when the Chōshū faction attacked him, others could not stand up for Tojo because the Chōshū faction, which held the legitimacy of the army, was not someone that the anti-Chōshū faction could contend with at that time.

Hayashi Shin-yoshi's words are actually telling Tamura that Yamagata Aritomo was not the founder of the army. The army was founded by Takasugi and Ōmura, and its ideology came from Yoshida and Hisasaka. In other words, Yamagata was just a transitional figure in the process of creating the army, and therefore has no deified status.

Tamura was an ambitious army general; otherwise, he wouldn't have directly petitioned the Imperial General Headquarters against Yamagata's advance plan during the First Sino-Japanese War, ultimately forcing Yamagata to return to Japan to recuperate. In his youth, he also formed a small military group opposing the Choshu-Satsuma regime. Although this group eventually disbanded, Tamura was clearly different from other generals in politics; he had his own political ideals.

Therefore, Tamura understood the meaning that Togo couldn't grasp almost instantly, because Hayashi Nobuyoshi was essentially implying that he could shake the Choshu faction's dominance in the army by denying Yamagata Genro's status as the sole founder of the army.

If we elevate the role of Takasugi and Ōmura in the creation of the army, and then promote the populist political ideology of equality for all, then the Choshu faction, which currently seems unshakeable within the army, will be shaken from within.

As a member of the broader Choshu faction, Tamura naturally knew that the Choshu faction was not a monolithic entity. Kodama's confidence in opposing Yamagata stemmed from the fact that he himself was another source of the Kiheitai (Special Forces). He was dissatisfied with Yamagata attributing all the credit for the creation of the army to himself, and this dissatisfaction actually received support from many members of the Choshu faction.

Therefore, if he were to shake Yamagata Aritomo's position in the army by promoting the ideas of Yoshida and Hisasaka, the Choshu faction might not be able to unite against him. This would mean that after he took over as Minister of the Army, he would not need to become a puppet of the Choshu faction. Instead, he could use the internal contradictions of the Choshu faction to try to break the situation in the army where Yamagata's faction was the only one in power.

Compared to this, Hayashi Nobuyoshi's contempt for the Emperor's army did not provoke Tamura's anger, since it concerned his personal interests rather than a vague ideological dispute.

Therefore, a scene that surprised Togo Masamichi occurred. After thinking it over, Tamura did not refute Hayashi Shin's remarks. Instead, he agreed and said, "Indeed, Mr. Yoshida's theory of the rise of the common people is the true source of military ideology for today's army. Yamagata Genro only inherited this idea, and did not even carry it forward."

The army's aspirations should indeed be sought by tracing back to its roots; otherwise, it cannot truly understand itself.

After giving Lin Xinyi a few brief replies, Tamura looked at the young naval lieutenant commander and cautiously changed the subject, asking, "But what is the necessary connection between establishing a people-oriented political system based on equality for all and a diplomatic policy for peace in East Asia?"

Lin Xinyi thought about it seriously for a while before realizing that the key point Tamura was asking was how to get the army to accept that East Asian peace and the army's interests were aligned, which was actually very difficult to connect.

After all, in the eyes of soldiers who have received militaristic education, peace is clearly not the goal of the army; conquering foreign tribes is the army's mission.

Only after World War I did the proletariat of various countries wake up and realize that the proletariat was merely expendable material for militarism. Apart from being linked to national honor in slogans, they could not obtain state protection in terms of interests, because the state would only protect the interests of the ruling class, while the proletariat was the ruled class under the militaristic system.

Militarists often say that you are nothing without a country, but in fact, the ruled class cannot exist in any country. The proletariat wants to protect its interests, not the country, but to seize power.

A state only has meaning for the proletariat when the proletariat controls the state apparatus. Therefore, for the proletariat, without a proletarian regime, you are truly nothing.

Tamura's problem is actually unsolvable, because Tamura does not consider himself a member of the proletariat, and the army today is not the armed force of the proletariat. Therefore, the goal of seeking peace for the proletariat in East Asia cannot be linked to the interests of the military.

Therefore, after much consideration, Lin Xinyi could only continue to speculate on the direction of racial war. He said to Tamura: "If we see the future as a competition between races, then a great racial war will inevitably break out between white people and people of color. This great war will determine the life and death of the race. The winner will gain everything, while the loser will not only lose their homeland, but will even be stripped of their human identity."

This is not an exaggeration. When Europeans exterminated the natives of the Americas and Pacific islands, they first denied that they were human beings. After labeling these natives as animals, they could then justify their extermination.

Therefore, a great war between races is inevitably far more dangerous than ordinary national wars. It is a racial war in which one race aims to completely annihilate another race to obtain all natural resources. This means that such a war must mobilize all the manpower and material resources of a race until all its war potential is exhausted.

Therefore, I believe that racial war is a major war in which the entire race must be mobilized. If any part of the force is not mobilized, or becomes an internal opponent, it will cause the entire race to lose its right to survive.

The East Asian peace theory is based on this understanding: the purpose of East Asian peace is not simply peace, but to gather the greatest support in future ethnic conflicts, which is why reconciliation among the various ethnic groups in East Asia is necessary.

The army cannot expect to win this racial war by expanding a few divisions with Japan's national strength, because even if we develop all of Japan's manpower, we will still fail.

Because we are not facing one or two white powers, but an entire world built by white people. Moreover, white people have mastered more advanced productive forces than people of color through the Industrial Revolution. This means that after white people eliminate people of color, they can use this advanced productive force to further develop the world's resources. This is the root cause of white people launching racial wars.

Therefore, what Japan needs is the unity of all people of color, to concentrate everyone's strength to resist the invasion of white people, and to accelerate the absorption of industrial civilization by people of color. Only when people of color have mastered social productivity equal to that of white people will white people give up their ambition to eliminate people of color and monopolize the earth's resources.

Therefore, the interests of East Asian peace and the army are naturally aligned, because the army's primary task is to deal with future racial wars, not the current conquest of its neighbors. If people of color are defeated in future wars, what is the point of Japan occupying more land today? In the end, it will only be doing the work for the white people.

To prepare for future racial conflicts, we must not only unite our comrades within our own race, but also further promote the development of civilian politics. This is because tycoons and politicians only consider immediate gains; they will not think about long-term interests. Only ordinary people will need a nation that can effectively protect their own interests, and only they will become our staunchest supporters in a racial conflict.

Although Tamura had passed his passionate youth, he had to admit that Lin Xinyi's racial war was not without reason. At least Lin Xinyi's assertion that white people who had mastered advanced productivity wanted to monopolize the earth's resources was not unfounded.

The British enslavement of the Indian people, the extermination policies of the Australian Aborigines, and the persecution of indigenous peoples by Europeans and Americans in Africa and the Americas all prove that this judgment is a fact that is happening and not a conjecture.

Given these unfolding facts, it's only natural to conclude that a racial war is inevitable in the future. The only question is, will this racial war really be as brutal as Lin Hsin-yi describes?

After all, the Japanese also saw in this great war that Russian soldiers also felt fear and fled, and they did not seem much stronger than Japanese soldiers. Therefore, it was hard to imagine that white people had the ambition and ability to completely exterminate people of color in a racial war.

In response to Tamura's doubts, Hayashi Shin-yi simply asked, "Can we leave Japan's fate to God's judgment? The Army doesn't believe that our neighboring countries, with whom we have had close relations for thousands of years, are tolerant of Japan, yet we can expect that the white people who have massacred Africans, Native Americans, Australians, and South Asians will live peacefully with Japan? Isn't the Army being far too wishful?"

Tamura finally ran out of things to say, and the conversation could no longer continue at this point, because Tamura could not easily make a final decision. The Navy clearly did not want the Army to compromise, but rather hoped that the Army could carry out an internal reform.

This proposal was indeed a bit radical for Tamura, but he did not reject it on the spot because he realized that this was his only chance to break the deadlock.

After Tamura left the room with a heart full of worries, Togo Masamichi finally breathed a sigh of relief. This conversation had been far too thrilling for him, even more exciting than when he discussed with Kawahara and the others how to deal with Yamamoto Gonbei.

After all, they still had the ability to protect themselves at that time, but if they completely broke with the army, they might really be expelled from the military.

Regardless of the antagonism between the army and the navy, the navy still holds a basic understanding that the foundation of the empire lies in the army, not the navy, because the navy has no ability to stabilize domestic order. Therefore, if the army and navy abandon the rules and engage in full-scale confrontation, the navy will still be at a disadvantage.

If Lin Hsin-yi's criticisms of the Army today were to spread, the Navy would not dare to vouch for him at all. They would have no choice but to distance themselves from Lin Hsin-yi, or rather, to throw him out to appease the Army's anger. After all, Lin Hsin-yi was only a lieutenant colonel, and the Navy was only qualified to appease the Army by taking his head.

Therefore, the most nervous person in this conversation was actually him, who didn't say much, rather than the two main people talking.

After Tamura left, Togo finally couldn't help but complain, "Nobuyoshi, you were too frank with Chief of Staff Tamura. If Tamura had insisted on prioritizing the army, wouldn't we have been digging our own graves today?"

Lin Xinyi glanced at him, then calmly picked up his wine glass, toasted him, and comforted him, saying, "Didn't you see? Tamura has already been abandoned by the Choshu faction. He's just a scapegoat thrown out by Yamagata. His betrayal won't change our situation. Everyone will just think that the army is staging this to drag the navy down with them."

Therefore, no one will believe him.

Conversely, if we can persuade Tamura to take advantage of the situation and push for internal reforms within the army, he might be able to escape the negative effects of the downsizing, which would greatly enhance the navy's influence within the military. The losses are small, but the gains are enormous; this is a risk worth taking…”

Chapter 695

Chapter 695

After leaving the restaurant, Tamura did not return home, but went to the home of his best friend, Asada Nobuoki. As a co-founder of the Monday Club, Asada Nobuoki had more seniority than Tamura. When he graduated, there was no Army Academy yet, only the Army Military Academy.

Asada Nobuoki belonged to the first generation of soldiers in Japan whose military system was transitioning from its own culture to a Western-style one. Strictly speaking, he was part of the first generation of officers in the new army, just one generation younger than figures like Yamagata. Politically, Asada Nobuoki aligned himself with the position of Ōmura Masujirō, the founder of the Military Academy. Ōmura believed that a national army should replace the samurai class, which led to the political ideal of a new nation that overthrew the Choshu-Satsuma regime.

However, after Ōmura's assassination, the military and samurai eventually reached a compromise, with army officers becoming the new samurai, and Ōmura's ideals came to nothing. Although Asada Nobuoki abandoned his youthful ideals, his aversion to the Choshu faction ensured that he maintained close ties with Tamura, even after Tamura eventually joined Kodama's forces.

Unlike Tamura, who spent most of his life in the General Staff, Asada Nobuoki served in the military for most of his life. As a result, he had a certain influence at the grassroots level of the military, especially in the Imperial Guard Division. Therefore, after Kodama's death, Tamura quickly formed a political alliance with Asada Nobuoki. The alliance did not have any specific goals at the beginning; it was just to deal with the chaos in the military after Kodama's death.

However, as Tamura took office as Chief of the General Staff, his dependence on Asada deepened. Asada became his channel to bypass the Choshu faction and connect with lower-ranking officers and soldiers. Asada Nobuoki also needed Tamura's support because his subordinates had to be promoted through Tamura. He himself could not control the personnel of the army controlled by the Choshu faction.

Asada Nobuyuki was aware of Tamura's private contacts with the Navy, especially today's meeting, which was known only to him. Therefore, Asada had been waiting at home for the results. He was not surprised by Tamura's visit, but he was surprised that Tamura had returned earlier than he had expected.

Tamura didn't hide anything, and frankly said after entering the room, "I chatted with Hayashi Shinji of the Navy, but I wasn't in the mood to socialize with Togo, so I said goodbye and came back."

Asada Nobuyuki paused for a moment before reacting and saying, "You mean that naval lieutenant commander who came back from India? How is he? Is he different from the rumors?"

Tamura accepted the hot tea Asada offered him, took a small sip, and then sighed, saying, "Our intelligence clearly underestimated him. Lin Xinyi didn't gain Indian support through any personal charisma. I can only say that his ability to force the British Indian government to admit defeat was due to his personal talent, not luck. A man like him would have stood out and become a powerful figure in the late Edo period. It seems the navy has indeed unified its will, rather than just temporarily."

Asada Nobuyuki naturally understood what Tamura was talking about. Tamura had exchanged some views on the navy with him. According to the intelligence gathering and judgment of the General Staff on the navy, most people in the General Staff felt that it was impossible for the navy to achieve internal unity of thought so quickly. After all, according to the intelligence they had obtained, in this internal debate within the navy, Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyōe's side was the one at a disadvantage.

The navy is different from the army. The army was transformed from the anti-shogunate coalition, so it can be said that it was formed much earlier than the navy. Moreover, the core members of the Meiji Restoration government were almost all from the army. As for the navy, with the death of Sakamoto Ryoma, the navy did not have a real core figure in charge. Katsu Kaishu was, after all, a former retainer of the shogunate, so the Meiji Restoration government transferred the core members of the Satsuma clique to take charge of the navy, which ultimately resulted in an outsider leading an expert. It was not until the era of Saigo Tsugumichi, when naval talents such as Yamamoto Gonnohyōe returned from overseas, that the navy truly entered the core decision-making circle of the government.

In the past, it was just a group of army generals who exercised the navy's decision-making power on behalf of the navy, and they did not consider the navy's interests entirely. For example, Kuroda Kiyotaka, as a veteran of the navy, focused his energy on the development of Hokkaido, needlessly using a large amount of funds and personnel in the Hokkaido interior, which did not bring much benefit to the navy. This was also a major reason why Kuroda found it difficult to obtain the navy's support in his later years.

With the trust of Saigo Tsugumichi, Yamamoto Gonnohyōe unified the will of the Navy, making military expansion the top priority. However, not everyone in the Navy supported Yamamoto's approach. It wasn't that the Navy opposed military expansion, but rather that there was dissatisfaction within the Navy with Yamamoto's personnel reform plan under the banner of military expansion. However, Saigo Tsugumichi suppressed the opposition within the Navy by virtue of the Saigo family's prestige, and ultimately achieved a unified consciousness within the Navy.

The victory in the First Sino-Japanese War greatly reduced criticism of Yamamoto's policies within the navy. The resounding victory in the recent naval battle against Russia further elevated Yamamoto Gonnohyōe's prestige to new heights. The grand welcome ceremony for the victorious return of the Grand Fleet fueled his continued rise in popularity among the people, even surpassing that of Saigō Tsugumichi.

In this climate of public opinion, the Army General Staff might have believed that Yamamoto Gonnohyōe had unified the will within the Navy. However, the news coming from within the Navy is the opposite. Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, as the unsung hero behind the victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, was forced to abandon his expansionist policies due to opposition within the Navy. Therefore, the Army naturally believes that the Navy has only compromised, rather than truly unified its consciousness.